The Shortcomings of Realism in a Global Era

When the Dog Bites, When the Bee Stings:
The Shortcomings of Realism in a Global Era

Most people have a conception of world politics akin to a game of chess—power, strategy and stability in a system of uncertainty. Each move is made based on rational choice, maximizing gains and minimizing loss. This is the realist paradigm— prevalent since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1478 when the “state” was born. While the realist paradigm is able to explain some events in global affairs, it fails to explain them all. This lens lacks depth in analysis hence providing a superficial explanation for events, which leads to ineffective foreign policy. This production of superficial analysis of global issues and ineffective policy prescriptions is evident in the emergence of non-state actors and the importance of symbols and emotions in ethnic conflict. In considering the shortcomings of realist thought, I will discuss contemporary theories that consider the challenges of contemporary issues.

The philosophy in question manifests in the key works by the fathers of realism, including, Thucydides and Machiavelli. Thucydides, a Greek historian, analyzes war between the Athenians and Spartans in, The History of the Peloponnesian War, as a war fought to acquire power. In the “Melian Dialogue,” a portion of the book dedicated to the discourse between the Melians and Athenians, Thucydides writes, “since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Thucydides argues that wars are fought over power. If an army is capable of winning a war, then they will fight it. Over millennia later, Niccolo Machiavelli similarly advocates the inherency of evil in man and the role of power seeking actors play in causing war. In his work, The Prince, Machiavelli advises that the objective of a prince is to obtain and maintain power. To do so, the prince must be dedicated to the art of war and must understand and accept that violent means may be necessary to maintain stability and power. Hence, realism is rooted in a philosophy that man is inherently evil and conflict is caused by the need to obtain or maintain power for security.

Although there are several strands of realism elaborating on different aspects of the theory, several core assumptions exist that define a realist. Realist theory is rooted in a philosophy that contends that man is inherently evil, initiated by English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Man yearns for power, and conflict is caused by gaining or maintaining power. The nature of the system is anarchic, meaning no central source of governance exists. Sovereign states are the principal actors, and each state is rational and acts in their own national interest for their national security. Relations between states lay in their power, which can be defined through military, economic or moral terms.

Now in the past, the state has been the key actor in international relations. States waged war on each other; weak states succumbed to more powerful ones; power was defined as military might. However, today non-state actors have emerged. One must keep in mind that a theory is only a lens in which one sees the world. While a certain shade may highlight power as the cause for war, others may reveal different causes for war that were previously hidden from the eye. For example, realist theory cannot fully explain the emergence of terrorism. Realist theory views the outbreak of war as the result of a security dilemma. If a nation-state feels as though it is threatened then it will raise the power of its military. The aggressor responds in a similar fashion. War is won by the most military powerful nation-state. Yet this theory is inadequate when trying to understand issues that transgress nation-state boundaries. Terrorism, for example is a non-state actor. Therefore applying a theory meant for state actors to a non state actor is illogical.

Moreover, realist theory fails to explain the outbreak of ethnic war as described by Stuart J. Kaufman in his recent book, Modern Hatreds: Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Kaufman explains that myths, ethnic fears and the opportunity to mobilize are the preconditions for ethnic war. Nations do not go to war simply to maintain power or because they can, but because myths are propagated or symbols are manipulated to mobilize the mass or instigate the elites to cause war. The cover of Kaufman’s book provides an excellent example of elite-led violence. Croatian leader, Franco Tudjman, kisses a Croatian flag that once symbolized Nazi-fascist Ustashe terror. This image flared ethnic hatred between the Serbs and the Croats and instigated a war that erupted in the region. Symbolic politics rather than realist theory explain the emergence of ethnic war in the former Yugoslav. In this case, a military power struggle is unable to explain the violence and resulting ethnic war. Thus, realist theory is crippled.

Failed Policy
The real need for a departure from realist thought is evident in the foreign policy that is developed based on the realist lens. While analysis can be skewed by a single lens, it is only analysis. But foreign policy is developed out of this analysis. And that is where the real danger lies. Incorrect analysis will create inefficient policy, policy that may even worsen a situation than ameliorate it.

For example, the United States suffered from an attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. In response, the United States increased defense spending, recruited troops and declared war against countries that were “against us.” As I write this, the U.S. is still engaged in unpopular military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. How could it be that the most advanced use of force the world has ever seen cannot squander the efforts of a relatively small number of individuals in a military battle? Perhaps the military is ill equipped for the intimidation of non-state actors. The continued conflict is a result of the inability of realism in applying to non-state actors.

Hard power
Hard power is generally associated with command power. Command power is “the ability to change what others do” and it “can rest on coercion or inducement.” Typically, hard power methods include using force, sanctions, payments and bribes. The current administration’s handling of the War on Terrorism, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, are prime examples of fighting terrorism through using hard power methods.

Soft Power
The term “soft power” was coined by Joseph S. Nye in the late 1980’s. The definition of soft power requires more explanation than hard power as it is less direct and a newer term. However, the term must be understood entirely in order to the power of the solutions described later in this paper.

Soft power tends to be associated with co-optive power rather than command power. Co-optive power is the ability to shape what others want” and it “can rest on the attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic.” Instead of using coercion to get what you want, soft power explores attraction instead. Soft power is an “attractive power,” that “gets others to want the outcomes you want” and “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.” There are three main sources of soft power for a country: “Culture (in places where it is attractive to others), political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).” By projecting attractive culture, political values and foreign policies, one can maximize their soft power.

The drawbacks of hard power and the benefits of soft power
“If you live near a swamp that is home to thousands of mosquitoes carrying malaria, you can kill the mosquitoes but more will come carrying the same disease. The only real solution is to deal with the swamp, the incubator of the disease.”
Using hard power methods to fight terrorism may seem effective immediately but in the long run, it fails to fight terrorism and in some instances could even breed new terrorists. Examining our nations past hard power approaches to foreign affairs can help us to understand the drawbacks of using hard power methods to fight terrorism. For example, “The four week war in Iraq in the spring of 2003 was a dazzling display of Americas hard military power that removed the tyrant, but it did not resolve our vulnerability to terrorism.” Although the war in Iraq was a military success, it failed to prevent any further terrorist attacks. In fact, “regime change or the destruction of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq will not, by itself bring peace. Others would replace Sadam in due course of time.” Hard power simply fights the current terrorists but does nothing to prevent the growth of future terrorists.

Furthermore, deterrence policies, such as current policies for the War on Terrorism do the exact opposite than what the goal of the policy was. “Terrorists are locked into their organizations even more and see no alternatives but to stay on.” It causes terrorists to continue to be terrorists, since they provide no options for them. Using hard power does not give terrorists reasons to change yet instead “creates substantial additional economic costs, increases vulnerability to terrorist acts, and strengthens terrorist’s cohesiveness and influence.” Once more, using hard power tactics against terrorism adds fuel to the fire instead of water.

Nye describes in an excerpt from Soft Power why soft power is effective and could better be used than hard power to hinder terrorism growth.
“When countries make their power legitimate in the eyes of others, they encounter less resistance to their wishes. If a country’s culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others. If it uses institutions and follows rules that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it will not need as many costly carrots and sticks.”

Therefore, the international community must utilize soft power to fight terrorism. By using an attractive force rather than a coercive one to stop terrorists from organizing and acting, terrorism will be fought at the root instead of the tree. When individuals are attracted to Western culture and politics, they will not have a need to fight against them. These individuals living in nations where terrorist cells organize and operate, need incentives that are more attractive than those terrorists provide in order to not join the movement.

Although wars have been fought since man has been on earth should not prevent man from flirting with the idea that peace is possible. Pessimists argue that the status quo is never changing. To them I suggest they pick up a history book. Peace is possible, but as Gandhi said, nonviolence is a tool for the strong, not the weak.

A realization that realist policy blinds the eye from seeing reasons behind conflict must be obtained for all intellectuals in the field. Those who study global issues must push the limits of the field, step over the boundaries of the status quo, and continue to test and invent new theories. At the same time, intellectuals must realize that the system is creating venues for violence to erupt. Therefore to end this violence, the injustice must be revealed. In most cases, the cause for violence is one that is manipulated by the media or by power hungry elites. Like an onion, layers of fallacies must be peeled off in order to discover the core cause of the eruption of violence to be a system of injustice, and non violent social revolution is the only means to rectify the system.